By abstaining from voting together with the former ruling party for NATO's free access to our aerial space, PDSR (Social Democracy Party) undermined its own credibility in front of the NATO officials and our chances to get an invitation in 2002. During the final part of a debate related to security problems, organized in the US, I had the opportunity of meeting an American official of the Defense Department, whose name and function - both very influential - will remain confidential; he had the amiability of disclosing the truth about the NATO extension and Romania's chances to become a member of this organization. His analysis focused mainly on the technical aspects of this extension and their influence on the political decisions, the political decisions proper (which might very well contradict his analysis), and the 2/3 vote of the American Senate. A first observation concerns the fact that the 2002 political decision, which shall be made during the Prague summit, will depend more on a series of technical aspects (i.e. the stage of the reforming process in the countries intending to become NATO members) than the decision made at Madrid in 1997. Why? Because "the three new members invited in 1997 and accepted in 1999 did not measure up to our expectations and generated problems continuously, after we ( the administration ) had had to do our best in order to present the Senate the benefits that the acceptance of countries such as Czechia, Hungary and Poland might offer the Alliance". But what didn't Czechia, Hungary and Poland manage to do? They did not increase their defense budgets as they had promised and didn't encourage the military reform after becoming NATO members, focusing their efforts on the integration into EU. We should notice the fact that the Washington administration is waiting for very concrete arguments referring to the benefits USA might derive from