The Law of Statute in the neighbor countries to Hungary turned into a game with null sum: someone has to lose. No matter what the officials in Budapest might state, in the governmental circles, the fundamental reason why of the Law of statute of the Hungarians outside the Hungarian frontiers is the reparation of the "injustice made at Trianon", be it an indirect one. "To re-gather the nation" is the aim perceived as a historical mission of the Orban cabinet. The chosen moment is the most proper one: Hungary is, comparing to its neighbors with important Hungarian minorities, in a position of maximal power. It is a NATO member, therefore it has a veto in any extension decision of the Alliance. It is the most advanced country in the Central and Eastern Europe in the adherence negotiations for the European Union. It will have veto right there too, at least in the matters concerning Romania. The advantages, doubled by an acute sense of its political and historical mission, transform Budapest into a political machinery of big effectiveness. In 1990 an evaluation took place (an informal and more or less tacit one) as for Hungary's chances to find a solution to "the national problem". The "tough" scenario, purely theoretical, was talking about re-winning by force the territories compactly occupied by Hungarians in the neighbor countries, especially in Romania and Slovakia. The "soft" scenario supposed an attempt of Hungary to become a very strong actor in the region, strong enough to protect, according tot he circumstances, the Hungarian minorities. The "tough", "classic" scenario felt down immediately, as Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Ukraine could have easily crash Hungary from a military point of view. Today, with the adoption of the Law of Statute we assist to the achievement of the "soft" scenario: Hungary thinks it accumulated enough power and prestige to rem