Montenegro's secessionist tendencies indicate the appearance of a new political fashion: the nationalism of the small communities. In July 1999, immediately after the NATO bombardments in Yugoslavia, one could read the following title in "The Economist": "Not so fast, Djukanovic!". This title expressed the worries of the international community about the hurry characterizing the young president of the Montenegro republic, Milo Djukanovic, who tried to separate his state from Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. The leader of the small republic of the Yugoslavian federation had to be cautious because of four reasons: 1) he was not sure that NATO could intervene again in case Milosevic reacted in a violent way 2) a part of the Montenegro population was on the Serbians' side 3) the new independent state did not have enough economic resources in order to survive 4) the Montenegro precedent might have undermined Bosnia's and Kosovo's situation. At that moment, the Montenegro republic was practically separated from the federation; the army and the currency (i.e. the dinar) were the last common elements. Djukanovic used a powerful local police as an alternative to the federal armed forces; this police controlled the frontiers with Albania and Croatia. He also had his own external policy, supported by a network of non-official ambasadors. He supported the penetration of the German mark in order to protect his country from inflation. Even if it had been bombarded by the NATO forces, due to its democratic option, Montenegro had an international status different from that of Serbia and received a significant help form EU. In spite of this situation, the republic was formally a part of Serbia, and the international community wanted to underline and maintain this situation. During the last two years, the situation in Serbia changed a lot, but Montenegro's secessionist tendencies stayed t