The Georgian crisis can be described as the last night of single-polarism and the first night of asymmetric multi-polarism. It is the first war of a (dis)order characterized by the competition between asymmetric centers of radiation in terms of asymmetric nature and power, which impose their priorities in an area measured by the length of the arm of each other.

The Georgian crisis can be described as the last night of single-polarism and the first night of asymmetric multi-polarism. It is the first war of a (dis)order characterized by the competition between asymmetric centers of radiation in terms of asymmetric nature and power, which impose their priorities in an area measured by the length of the arm of each other. Sparks appear when those arms touch. They start peripheral wars meant to correct the power report between the centers.

In such a context, after oscillating between global equilibrium and the recovery of relative superiority, the Euro-Atlantic democracies try to find appropriate responses to the reactivation of the Russian power. As usual, predictable events take the West by surprise, trying its reaction after its lack in initiative has been proven.

The dilemma of the Euro-Atlantic post-unipolar world confronted with the Russian - Asian neo-imperialism is the one of a choice between confrontation and conciliation. The alternative is bad for both components. Even if Russia is no longer the Soviet superpower it used to be, the direct confrontation with it costs that much that no democracy can afford it. Conciliation isn’t an option either because the Russian leaders (as, in fact, all the leaders of nations with great taste for authority and paternalist traditions) distinguish only the language of force and firmness.

Until one finds the line between the two, the West should avoid the strategy of com